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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model where this is a trade-off between the enforcement of the property rights
of different groups. An "oligarchic" society, where political power is in the hands of major
producers, protects their property rights, but also tends to erect significant entry barriers, violating
the property rights of future producers. Democracy, where political power is more widely diffuesed,
imposes redistributive taxes on the producers, but tends to avoid entry barriers. When taxes in
democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low, an oligarchic society
achieves greater efficiency. Nevertheless, because comparative advantage in entreprenuership shifts
away from the incumbents, the inefficiency created by entry barriers in oligarchy deteriorates over
time. The typical pattern is therefore one of the rise and decline of oligarchic societies: of two
otherwise identical societies, the one with an oligarchic organization will first become richer, but
later fall behind the democratic society. I also discuss how democratic societies may be better able
to take advantage of new technologies, and how the unequal distribution of income in an oligarchic
society supports the oligarchic institutions and may keep them in place even when the become
significantly costly to society.
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There is now a growing consensus that institutions protecting the property rights of pro-
ducers are essential for successful long-run economic performance.1 There is no agreement,
however, on what constitutes "protecting the property rights of producers" or on the costs
and beneﬁts of various diﬀerent "forms of property rights". One possibility is an oligarchic
society where political power is in the hands of the economic elite, for example, the ma-
jor producers/investors in the economy. This type of organization not only ensures that
major producers do not fear expropriation or high rates of taxation, but also typically
enables them to create a non-level playing ﬁeld and a monopoly position for themselves,
in essence violating the property rights of future potential producers (i.e., excluding them
from taking advantage of proﬁt opportunities). The alternative is democracy (or perhaps
more appropriately, populist democracy), where political power is more equally distrib-
uted, thus eﬀectively in the hands of poorer agents who can use their power to tax the
producers’ proﬁts.2 But in return, incumbent producers will be unable to create signiﬁ-
cant entry barriers against entrants, ensuring better property rights for future potential
producers.3
This paper constructs a simple model to analyze the trade-oﬀ between oligarchic and
democratic societies. The model features two policy distortions: taxation and entry bar-
riers. Taxes, which redistribute income from entrepreneurs to workers, are distortionary
because they discourage entrepreneurial investment. Entry barriers, which redistribute
income towards the entrepreneurs by reducing labor demand and depressing wages, dis-
tort the allocation of resources because they prevent the entry of more productive agents
into entrepreneurship.4
1See, among others, the general discussions in Jones (1981), North (1981), and Olson (1982), and the
empirical evidence in De Long and Shleifer (1993), Knack and Keefer (1995), Barro (1999), Hall and
Jones (1999), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002).
2Although there is a close connection between dictatorship and oligarchy, some electoral democracies
may be "oligarchic" according to the deﬁnition here, because the economic elite controls the parties or
the electoral agenda.
3In certain societies such as in Zaire under Mobutu, a highly predatory state, controlled either by an
individual or the political elite, may violate the property rights of both incumbent and future producers.
The focus here is not these cases, but the trade-oﬀs between distortionary redistributive taxation and
entry barriers. A full taxonomy of regimes would distinguish predatory regimes from oligarchic and
democratic regimes.
4Entry barriers may take the form of direct regulation, or of policies that reduce the costs of inputs,
especially of capital, for the incumbents, while raising them for potential rivals. Cheap loans and subsidies
to the chaebol appear to have been a major entry barrier for new ﬁrms in South Korea (see, for example,
Kang, 2002). See also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) on the implications of government
ownership of banks, which often enables incumbents to receive subsidized credit, thus creating entry
1The trade-oﬀ between these two diﬀerent types of distortions determines whether an
oligarchic or a democratic society is more eﬃcient and generates greater aggregate output.
Oligarchy avoids the disincentive eﬀects of taxation, but suﬀe r sf r o mt h ed i s t o r t i o n si n t r o -
duced by entry barriers. Democracy imposes higher redistributive taxes, but also tends to
create a more level playing ﬁeld.5 When the taxes that a democratic society will impose
are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low, oligarchy achieves greater
eﬃciency and generates higher output; when democratic taxes are relatively low and en-
try barriers create signiﬁcant misallocation of resources, a democratic society achieves
greater aggregate output. In addition, a democratic society typically generates a more
equal distribution of income than an oligarchic society, because it redistributes income
from entrepreneurs to workers, while an oligarchic society adopts policies that reduce
labor demand, depress wages and increase the proﬁts of incumbents.
More interesting are the dynamic trade-oﬀs between these political regimes. Initially,
entrepreneurs will tend to be those with greater productivity, so an oligarchic society
generates only limited distortions. However, as long as comparative advantage in entre-
preneurship changes over time, it will eventually shift away from the incumbents, and the
entry barriers erected in oligarchy will become increasingly costly to eﬃciency. A typical
pattern is therefore one where, of two otherwise identical societies, the oligarchy will ﬁrst
become richer, but later fall behind the democratic society. The model therefore sug-
gests that, at least under some parameter conﬁgurations, despite its potential economic
distortions, democracy is better for long-run economic performance than the alternatives.
I also show that democracies may be able to take better advantage of new technologies
than oligarchic societies. This is because democracy allows agents with comparative
advantage in new technology to enter entrepreneurship, while oligarchy typically blocks
new entry.
The above discussion takes the political regime and the distribution of political power,
in particular whether the society is oligarchic or democratic, as given. A major area of
research in political economy is the determination of equilibrium political institutions.
barriers for potential entrants. An interesting case in this context is Mexico at the end of the nineteenth
century, where the rich elite controlled a highly concentrated banking system, protected by entry barriers,
and the resulting lack of loans for new entrants enabled the elite to maintain a monopoly position in other
sectors. See Haber (1991, 2002).
5This argument does not deny the presence of entry barriers in democratic societies, for example in
much of Western Europe, but suggests that the role of entry barriers in these instances may be to create
r e n t st oas p e c i ﬁc group of workers rather than protecting incumbent ﬁrms (on cross-country patterns of
labor regulation, see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003).
2When should we expect a society to become oligarchic and remain so even when this
becomes increasingly costly? I analyze this question by embedding the basic setup in a
simple (and reduced-form) model of regime change where groups with greater economic
power are also more likely to prevail politically. Social groups that become substantially
richer in a given political regime may be able to successfully sustain that regime and
protect their privileged position. In oligarchy, incumbents have the political power to
erect entry barriers to raise their proﬁts. These greater proﬁts, in turn, increase their
political power, making a switch from oligarchy to democracy more diﬃcult, even when
entry barriers become signiﬁcantly costly.
Although the model economy analyzed in this paper is highly abstract, it nonetheless
sheds light on a number of interesting questions. The ﬁrst set of issues is the relative
economic performance of democratic and oligarchic societies. In practice, there are exam-
ples of both democratic and oligarchic societies that have achieved high rates of economic
growth. For example, the United States and much of Western Europe during the postwar
era illustrate the potential economic success of democratic societies. In contrast, Japan
both in the prewar and the postwar periods, and South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in
the postwar era are examples of oligarchic societies that have pursued pro-business policies
and achieved successful economic performance.6 The development experiences of Brazil
and Mexico, on the other hand, illustrate both the potential gains and signiﬁcant costs of
oligarchic regimes. Haber (2003), for example, explains how import-substitution policies
in these countries were adopted to protect the businesses of the rich elite aligned with
the government.7 He further documents how these import-substitution policies enabled
6All four countries approximate oligarchic societies. For example, in Japan, the pre-war era is com-
monly recognized as highly oligarchic, with the conglomerates known as the zaibatsu dominating both
politics and the economy (the title of the book on pre-war Japanese politics by Ramseyer and Rosenbluth,
1995, is Politics of Oligarchy). The postwar politics in Japan, on the other hand, have been dominated
by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which is closely connected to the business elite (see, for example,
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1997, and Jansen, 2000). In the Korean case, the close links between the large
family-run conglomerates, the chaebol, and the politicians are well-documented (see, for example, Kang,
2002). In both cases, government policy has been favorable to major producers and provided them with
subsidized loans and protected internal markets as well as secure property rights (e.g., Johnson, 1982,
Evans, 1995). For example, in Japan, the Antimonopoly Act of 1947 imposed by the Americans was
soon relaxed, and the LDP introduced various anticompetitive statutes to protect existing businesses.
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth report that in 1980 there were 491 cartels, and "almost half [of those] had been
in eﬀect for twenty-ﬁve years and over two-thirds for more than twenty years" (1997, p. 132). However,
it should also be noted that inequality of income in both cases has been limited, most likely because of
other historical reasons, for example, the extensive land reforms in South Korea undertaken to defuse
rural unrest fanned by the Communist regime in the North (e.g., Haggard, 1990).
7For example, he describes the formulation of policies in early 20th-century Mexico as "Manufacturers
who were part of the political coalition that supported the dictator Porﬁrio Diaz were granted protection,
3rapid industrialization both before and after World War II, but also created signiﬁcant
distortions and economic problems.
Beyond these selective examples, cross-country empirical analyses, e.g., Barro (1999),
show that in the postwar era, electoral democracies have not grown faster than dictator-
ships (which generally correspond to oligarchic societies in terms of the model), despite the
well-documented presence of disastrous dictatorships with very weak records of property
rights enforcement. The model is consistent with this pattern, because both democratic
and oligarchic societies create distortions. Successful economic performances will come
from democracies that are relatively less redistributive, and from oligarchic societies where
entry barriers are limited or where heterogeneity of productivity in entrepreneurship is
relatively unimportant.
Existing evidence is also consistent with the notion that democracies are more redis-
tributive, but introduce fewer entry barriers than oligarchies. For example, Djankov et al.
(2002, Table 7) show that there are more entry barriers in non-democracies than democra-
cies. Rodrik (1999) shows that labor share and wages are typically higher in democracies
than in dictatorships. Democracies also appear to tax more than non-democratic coun-
t r i e s . F i g u r e1s h o w sas i g n i ﬁcant positive correlation between tax revenue over GDP
against the Freedom House measure of democracy, once the eﬀect of log GDP per capita
has been taken out from both variables. Appendix B demonstrates that this pattern
is robust to controlling for education, population, continent dummies, and to excluding
former communist countries and federal countries.8
The second set of questions that the model might shed some light on relate to the rise
and decline of nations. A common conjecture in social sciences is that economic success
also lays the seeds of future failures (e.g., Kennedy, 1987, Olson, 1982). The analysis in this
paper suggests a speciﬁc mechanism formalizing this conjecture: early success might often
come from providing security to major producers, who then use their political power to
prevent entry by new groups, creating dynamic distortions. This mechanism is illustrated
by the contrast between the economic histories of the Northeastern United States and the
Caribbean during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.
everyone else was out in the cold" (p. 18), and during the later era, "manufacturers could lobby the
executive branch of government, which could then, without the need to seek legislative approval, restrict
the importation of competing products" (p. 48).
8Moreover, at least part of the economic problems of some democracies also seem to stem from "anti-
business" policies. See, for example, Besley and Burgess (2003) for an interesting analysis of the economic
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Residuals from Democracy Index
Figure 1: Residuals of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP in 1998 vs. residuals of
Freedom House democracy index in 1997-98. Both residuals are from a regression of the
corresponding variables on log GDP per capita in 1998. See Appendix B.
The Northeastern United States developed as a typical settler colony, approximating
a democratic society with signiﬁcant political power in the hands of smallholders (e.g.,
Galenson, 1996).9 In contrast, the Caribbean colonies were clear examples of oligarchic
societies, with political power in the monopoly of plantation owners, and few rights for the
slaves that made up the majority of the population (see, e.g., Beckford, 1972, and Dunn,
1972). In both the 17th and 18th centuries, the Caribbean societies were among the richest
places in the world, and almost certainly richer and more productive than the Northeastern
United States (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002, Coatsworth, 1993, Eltis,
1995, Engerman, 1981, and Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 1997). Although the wealth of the
Caribbean undoubtedly owed much to the world value of its main produce, sugar, it seems
that Caribbean societies were able to achieve these levels of productivity because the
planters had every incentive to invest in the production, processing and export of sugar.
But starting in the late 18th century, the Caribbean economies lagged behind the United
9This is a relative statement, not meant to deny the signiﬁcant power of rich industrialists and landown-
ers in the 19th-century United States (see, e.g., Beard, 1952).
5States and many other more democratic societies, which took advantage of new investment
opportunities, particularly in industry and commerce (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,
2002, and Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 1997). While new entrepreneurs in the United States
and Western Europe invested in these areas, power in the Caribbean remained in the
hands of the planters, who had no interest in encouraging entry by new groups.10 Though
not as stark as the contrast between the Northeastern United States and the Caribbean,
the experiences of other oligarchic societies, including those of Japan, South Korea, Brazil,
and Mexico, where initial growth supported by close relations between major producers
and the government has shown a tendency to come to an end, are also consistent with
the mechanism emphasized in this paper.
Many studies on economic growth and the political economy of development have
pointed out the costs of entry barriers, while others have emphasized the disincentive
eﬀects of redistributive taxation. For example, the classic by North and Thomas force-
fully articulates the view that monopoly arrangements are the most important barrier
to growth, and cite "the elimination of many of the remnants of feudal servitude,..., the
joint stock company, replacing the old regulated company" and "the decay of industrial
regulation and the declining power of guilds" as key foundations for the Industrial Rev-
olution in Britain (1973, p. 155). This point of view is also developed in Parente and
Prescott (1999), and in the recent book by Rajan and Zingales, where they emphasize the
threat to successful capitalism from the "incumbents, those who already have an estab-
lished position in the marketplace and would prefer to see it remain exclusive." (2003, p.
18). An even larger literature, on the other hand, focuses on the cost of redistribution.
For example, Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981), Persson and
Tabellini (1994), and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) all construct models in which the median
voter chooses high levels of redistributive taxation, distorting saving, investment or labor
supply decisions (see also Benabou, 2000, on how, under certain circumstances, democ-
racy may not generate enough redistribution). Barro succinctly summarizes the costs of
a democratic regime as "...the tendency to enact rich-to-poor redistribution of income
(including land reforms) in systems of majority voting and the possibly enhanced role of
interest groups in systems with representative legislatures." (1999, p. 49). Nevertheless, I
am not aware of any analysis that relates the distortions created by redistributive democ-
racy and those caused by entry barriers in oligarchy as the two sides of the trade-oﬀ over
10Sokoloﬀ and Kahn (1990) and Kahn and Sokoloﬀ (1993) show that many of the major U.S. inventors
in the 19th century were not members of the already-established economic elite, but new comers with
diverse backgrounds.
6the "form of property rights", nor any analysis of the dynamic costs of oligarchy.
Other closely related papers include Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Acemoglu, Aghion
and Zilibotti (2003), Leamer (1998), Robinson and Nugent (2001), and Galor, Moav
and Vollrath (2003). The result of potential cycles in oligarchy in the current model is
related to the political-economic cycles in Krusell and Rios-Rull (1994). In their model,
technology-speciﬁc investments create vested interests opposed to the introduction of new
technologies. The political power of these vested interests may lead to growth cycles. Ace-
moglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2003) develop a theory where protecting large ﬁrms at the
early stages of development is beneﬁc i a lb e c a u s ei tr e l a x e sp o t e n t i a lc r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t s ,
but such protection becomes progressively more costly as the economy approaches the
world technology frontier and selecting the right entrepreneurs becomes more important.
That paper also provides some empirical evidence that economies with high levels of en-
try and international trade restrictions suﬀer severe growth slowdowns as they approach
the world technology frontier. Finally, Leamer (1998), Robinson and Nugent (2001) and
Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2003) discuss the potential opposition of landowners to in-
vestment in human capital. For example, Galor et al. emphasize how land abundance
may initially lead to greater income per capita, but later retard human capital accumu-
lation and economic development. None of these papers contrasts the trade-oﬀs between
democracy and oligarchy or identiﬁes the dynamic costs of oligarchy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic en-
vironment, and characterizes the equilibrium for a given sequence of policies. Section
3 analyzes the political equilibrium in democracy and oligarchy, and compares the out-
comes. Section 4 discusses a simple model of changes of regime between oligarchy and
democracy. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 The Environment
I consider a non-overlapping generations economy consisting of a continuum 1 of dynasties.
There is a unique ﬁnal good which can be used for consumption or for bequest. Each
agent has a single oﬀspring, and is imperfectly altruistic with the utility function:
U
j
















t is the consumption of agent j at time t, b
j
t+1 is the bequest he leaves to his
oﬀspring, and z
j
t is the (non-pecuniary) cost of eﬀo r tt h a tt h ea g e n ti n c u r si fh eb e c o m e s
an entrepreneur.
This utility function is convenient since it implies a constant savings rule for each
agent of the form:
b
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t is the total income of the agent at time t. It also implies that the indirect
utility function of agent j at time t is simply given by U
j




t. Total income is in
turn the sum of earned income, W
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t ,a n db e q u e s t s ,b
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I assume that each dynasty disappears (dies) with a small probability ε in every period,
and a mass ε of new dynasties are born. I will consider the limit of this economy with
ε → 0. The reason for introducing the possibility of death is to avoid the case where the
supply of labor is exactly equal to the demand for labor for a range of wage rates, which
can otherwise arise in the oligarchic equilibrium. In other words, in the economy with
ε =0 , there may also exist other equilibria, and in this case, the limit ε → 0 picks a
speciﬁc one from the set of equilibria.
The key distinction in this economy is between production workers on the one hand
and capitalists/entrepreneurs on the other. Each agent can either be employed as a worker
or set up a ﬁrm to become an entrepreneur.11 W h i l ea l la g e n t sh a v et h es a m ep r o d u c t i v i t y
as workers, their productivity in entrepreneurship diﬀers. In particular, agent j at time
t has entrepreneurial talent a
j
t ∈ {AL,A H} with AL <A H. To become an entrepreneur,
an agent needs to set up a ﬁrm, or alternatively, he could inherit the ﬁrm from his
father. Setting up a new ﬁrm may be costly because of entry barriers created by existing
entrepreneurs.





t ∈ {AH,A L},a n ds
j
t ∈ {0,1} which denotes whether the individual has inherited
a ﬁrm. I will also refer to an agent with s
j
t =1as a member of the "elite", since he will
have an advantage in becoming an entrepreneur (when there are entry barriers), and in
an oligarchic society, he may be politically more inﬂuential than non-elite agents.
Within each period, each agent makes the following decisions: a consumption decision
denoted by c
j
t, a bequest decision denoted by b
j
t+1, and an occupation choice i
j
t ∈ {0,1}.
In addition if i
j
t =1 , i.e., if the agent becomes an entrepreneur, he also makes investment






t,w h e r eh
j
t denotes whether he
11See, for example, Banerjee and Newman (1993) for a model of occupational choice of this type.
8decides to hide his output in order to avoid taxation.
Agents also make the policy choices in this society. How the preferences of various
agents map into policies diﬀers depending on the political regime, which is discussed in
detail below. For now I note that there are three policy choices: a tax rate τt ∈ [0,1] on
output (the results are identical if τt is a tax on earned income, see footnote 21), lump-
sum transfers to all agents denoted by Tt ∈ [0,∞),a n dac o s tKt ∈ [0,∞) to set up a
new ﬁrm. I assume that the entry barrier Kt is pure waste, for example corresponding to
the bureaucratic procedures that individuals have to go through to open a new business
(see, e.g., De Soto, 1989, or Djankov et al., 2002). As a result, lump-sum transfers are
ﬁnanced only from taxes.12
An entrepreneur with talent a
j



















t is the amount of labor hired by the entrepreneur and e
j
t ≥ 0 is investment
(or entrepreneurial eﬀort). The cost of investment is non-pecuniary and equal to e
j
t.
Furthermore, there is a maximum scale, λ, beyond which the ﬁrm cannot operate, so
l
j
t ∈ [0,λ]. I also assume that the entrepreneur himself can work in his ﬁrm as one of the
workers, which implies that the opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur is 0.13
Operating a ﬁrm requires a non-pecuniary ﬂow cost, K0 ( t h i sc o s ti si n c u r r e di ne v e r y
period of operation, as opposed to the cost Kt incurred for entry).14 Therefore, the cost
of eﬀort is z
j








t +K0 +Kt for an entrepreneur
depending on whether he has to pay the entry cost or not. To simplify the expressions












as the return to entrepreneur j gross of the cost of entry barriers. Intuitively, the entre-
preneur produces y
j
t,p a y saf r a c t i o nτt of this in taxes, pays a total wage bill of wtl
j
t,a n d
12I assume that Kt is a non-pecuniary cost to simplify the discussion. Pecuniary entry barriers would
lead to identical results because, in the relevant equilibrium, potential entrepreneurs will lack the funds
to pay the upfront costs. Therefore, a pecuniary cost would also prevent entry like a non-pecuniary cost
and raise no additional revenues.
13Throughout I assume that each entrepreneur has to run the ﬁrm himself, so it is his productivity,
a
j
t, that matters for output. An alternative would be to allow costly delegation of managerial positions
to other, more productive agents. In this case, low-productivity entrepreneurs may prefer to hire more
productive managers. I discuss the implications of such a generalization in the conclusion.
14If K0 =0 , then in the absence of entry barriers, the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrm size is indeter-
minate. K0 > 0 avoids this complication.
9incurs an investment and operation cost of e
j
t + K0.W i t hs o m ea b u s eo ft e r m i n o l o g y ,I
will refer to π as the proﬁt function. Given a tax rate τt and a wage rate wt ≥ 0,t h en e t





























t − κλ, (4)
as long as the entrepreneur does not hide his output, i.e., h
j
t =0 . If he instead hides his
output, i.e., h
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The comparison of these two expressions immediately implies that if τt >δ , all entrepre-
neurs will hide their output, and there will be no tax revenue. Therefore, the relevant
range of taxes will be
0 ≤ τt ≤ δ.
Since, in the presence of entry barriers, entrepreneurship (i.e., i
j
t =1 )e n t a i l sa n
additional cost Kt for agents with s
j
t =0 , the net gain to becoming an entrepreneur for


































− (1 − s
j
t)ktλ (5)
where the last term indicates that if the agent does not inherit the ﬁrm from his father,
he will have to pay the additional cost imposed by entry barriers.15 Notice also that Π
is the net gain to becoming an entrepreneur, since the agent receives the wage rate wt
irrespective (either working for another entrepreneur when he is a worker, or working for
himself–thus having to hire one less worker–when he is an entrepreneur). This feature
implies that an agent will become an entrepreneur if Π
¡






> 0 (and can
become an entrepreneur only if Π
¡







15Private sales of ﬁrms from agents with s
j
t =1to those with s
j
t =0are not allowed (or they are
equivalently assumed to be subject to the entry cost Kt). This is without loss of generality, since, as
we will see below, entry barriers exist only in the oligarchic equilibrium, where the equilibrium wage is
zero and agents with s
j
t =0do not have the funds to ﬁnance the purchase of existing ﬁrms from the
incumbents.
Note that private sales of ﬁrms without any entry barrier-related costs would circumvent the ineﬃcien-
cies from entry barriers. The absence of such sales, and consequently the existence of real eﬀects of entry
barriers, seems plausible in practice (see, for example, Djankov et al., 2002, on the relationship between
entry barriers and various economic outcomes).
10Labor market clearing requires the total demand for labor not to exceed the supply.












tdj ≤ 1, (6)
where It is the set of entrepreneurs at time t.










which determines the “type” of agent j at time t.16 As already noted, bequests are given
by equation (2). The transition rule for s
j
t is straightforward: if agent j at time t sets up








0 =0for all j,a n da l s os
j
t =0if dynasty j is born at time t.F i n a l l y , I a s s u m e
that there is imperfect correlation between the entrepreneurial talents of diﬀerent agents







AH with probability σH if a
j
t = AH
AH with probability σL if a
j
t = AL
AL with probability 1 − σH if a
j
t = AH




where σH, σL ∈ (0,1).H e r e σH is the probability that an agent has high productivity
in entrepreneurship conditional on his father having high productivity, and σL is the
probability when his father has low productivity. It is natural to suppose that σH ≥ σL,
so that an individual is more likely to be highly productive if his parent is so. What
is important for the results is imperfect correlation of entrepreneurial talent within a
dynasty, i.e., σH < 1, so that the identities of the entrepreneurs necessary to achieve
productive eﬃciency change over time.
It can be veriﬁed easily that
M ≡
σL
1 − σH + σL
∈ (0,1).








. Bequests are introduced to
create a link between past proﬁts and the incomes of current elites, which plays a role in Section 4. For
most of the paper, there is no need to keep track of the distribution of bequests. It is also worth noting
that the model could be set up with inﬁnitely-lived agents, with little change in the results, though the
analysis becomes somewhat more complicated, because agents would have to take into account the future
implications of setting up a ﬁrm and becoming part of the elite. Since these issues are not central to the
focus here, I opted for the non-overlapping generations setup.
11is the fraction of agents with high productivity in the stationary distribution (i.e., M (1 − σH)=
(1 − M)σL). Since there is a large number of agents, I appeal informally to the weak law
of large numbers (ignoring complications related to the fact that there is a continuum of
agents), which implies that the fraction of agents with high productivity at any point is
M. Throughout I assume that
Mλ>1,
so that, without entry barriers, high-productivity entrepreneurs generate more than suf-
ﬁcient demand to employ the entire labor supply. Moreover, I think of M as small and λ
as large; in particular, I assume λ>2, which ensures that the workers are always in the
majority and simpliﬁes the political economy discussion below.








2. The entry barrier for new entrepreneurs kt is set.
















5. The labor market clearing wage rate, wt, is determined.
6. The tax rate on entrepreneurs, τt,i ss e t .




























j∈[0,1], or more formally,
the mapping at :[ 0 ,1] →
©
AL,A Hª
, which assigns a productivity level to each individual







Entry barriers and taxes will be set by diﬀerent agents in diﬀerent political regimes
as will be speciﬁed below. Notice that taxes are set after the investment decisions, which
can be motivated by potential commitment problems whereby entrepreneurs can be “held
up” after they make their investments decision. Once these investments are sunk and
employment decisions are made, it is in the interest of the workers to tax and redistribute
entrepreneurial income.17
17This timing of events is adopted to simplify the analysis and the exposition. Because there are only
122.2 Analysis
I start with the “economic equilibrium” which is the (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the
economy described above given a policy sequence {kt,τt}t=0,1,....T od e ﬁne this equilibrium

























t=0,1,... and a sequence of wage rates {ˆ wt}t=0,1,...













t maximizes the utility of agent j,( 1 ) ,a n dˆ wt clears the labor mar-


















I now characterize this equilibrium. Recall that s
j
0 =0for all j, and suppose k0 =0 ,
so that in the initial period there are no entry barriers (since s
j
0 =0for all j, any positive
entry barrier would create waste, but not aﬀect who enters entrepreneurship).
The ﬁxed costs of operation and the constant returns to scale technology imply that
all entrepreneurs will hire the maximum amount of labor. Thus, for all j ∈ It,
l
j
t = λ,( 9 )
where, recall that, It is the set of entrepreneurs at time t. Given this, investments will be:
e
j




(Alternatively, (10) can be written as e
j
t =( 1−ˆ τt)1/αa
j
tλ where ˆ τt is the tax rate expected
at the time of investment; in equilibrium, ˆ τt = τt).
Now using the equilibrium factor demands, (9) and (10), the net gain to entrepreneur-
ship, as a function of entry barriers, taxes, equilibrium wages, the status s
j
t of the agent
and entrepreneurial talent, can be obtained as:
Π
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tλ − wtλ − κλ − (1 − s
j
t)ktλ. (11)
two types of entrepreneurs, it turns out that if workers choose the tax rate before investment decisions,
they will set τt =0(see Appendix A). The timing of events here implies that they cannot commit to
this tax rate, and consequently ensures a positive level of redistribution. In Appendix A, I show that
the main results generalize to an environment where there are more than two levels of entrepreneurial
productivity and where voters set taxes τt at the same time as kt, i.e., before investment decisions. In
this case, voters choose τt > 0,t r a d i n go ﬀ redistribution and the disincentive eﬀects of taxation, as in,
among others, the models by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981).
13Moreover, since l
j
t = λ for all j, the labor market clearing condition (6) implies that
R






















Who will become an entrepreneur in this economy? Inspection of (11) immediately
shows that Π
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for any ˜ s
j
t and ˜ a
j
t,a n dt h eﬁrst term is always strictly greater than the third term. So
agents with a
j
t = AL and s
j
t =0will choose i
j
t =0 , becoming workers. On the other hand,
the occupational choice of agents with a
j
t = AL and s
j





t =0will depend on kt.
W ec a nt h e nd e ﬁne two diﬀerent types of equilibria:
1. Entry equilibrium where all entrepreneurs have a
j
t = AH.
2. Sclerotic equilibrium where agents with s
j
t =1become entrepreneurs irrespective of
their productivity.
An entry equilibrium requires that Π
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i.e., only if the net marginal product of labor of a high-productivity non-elite entrepreneur
is greater than that of a low-productivity elite. A sclerotic equilibrium will emerge, on
the other hand, only if the converse of (13) is the case.
Moreover, in an entry equilibrium, i.e., when (13) holds, we have
w
e






H − κ − kt;0
¾
. (14)
14This follows because, in equilibrium, Π
¡





must be equal to zero.
If it were strictly positive, or in other words, if the wage were less than we
t, all agents with
high productivity would enter entrepreneurship, and since, by assumption, Mλ>1 there
would be "excess demand" for labor. This argument also shows that it =1 /λ.
Figure 2 illustrates the entry equilibrium diagrammatically by plotting labor demand
and supply in this economy. Labor supply is constant at 1, while labor demand is decreas-
ing as a function of the wage rate. This ﬁgure is drawn under the assumption that (13)
holds, so that there exists an entry equilibrium. The ﬁrst portion of the curve shows the
demand of high-productivity elites, i.e., agents with a
j
t = AH and s
j
t =1 , and the second
portion is for high-productivity non-elites, i.e., those with a
j
t = AH and s
j
t =0 .T h e s et w o
groups together demand Mλ > 1 workers, ensuring that labor demand intersects labor
supply at the wage given in (14).
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Figure 2: Labor supply and labor demand when (13) holds and there exists an entry
equilibrium.
In a sclerotic equilibrium, on the other hand, low-productivity agents who inherited a




t−1. If there were no






1−α(1 − τt)1/αAH − κ − kt;0
ª
, α
1−α(1 − τt)1/αAL − κ
¤
, labor demand would
exactly equal labor supply–1/λ agents demanding exactly λ workers each, and a total
supply of 1. Hence, there would be multiple equilibrium wages. In contrast, when ε>0,
the measure of entrepreneurs who could pay a wage of α
1−α(1 − τt)1/αAL − κ is it =
15(1 − ε)it−1 < 1/λ for all t>0, thus there would be excess supply of labor at this wage, or
at any wage above the lower support of the above range. This implies that the equilibrium
wage would be equal to this lower support, max
©
α
1−α(1 − τt)1/αAH − κ − kt;0
ª
,w h i c h
i si d e n t i c a lt o( 1 4 ) . S i n c ea tt h i sw a g ea g e n t sw i t ha
j
t = AH and s
j
t =0are indiﬀerent
between entrepreneurship and working, in equilibrium a suﬃcient number of them enter
entrepreneurship, and it =1 /λ. In the remainder, I focus on the limiting case of this
economy where ε → 0,w h i c hp i c k smax
©
α
1−α(1 − τt)1/αAH − κ − kt;0
ª
as the equilibrium
wage even when labor supply coincides with labor demand for a range of wages.18
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Figure 3: Labor supply and labor demand when (13) does not hold and there exists a
sclerotic equilibrium.
Figure 3 illustrates this case diagrammatically. Because (13) does not hold in this
case, the second ﬂat portion of the labor demand curve is for low-productivity elites, i.e.,
agents with a
j
t = AL and s
j
t =1 , who, given the entry barriers, have a higher marginal
product of labor than high-productivity non-elites.
Finally, since at time t =0we have k0 =0 , the initial period equilibrium will feature:









18In other words, the wage max
n
α
1−α(1 − τt)1/αAH − κ − kt;0
o
at ε =0is the only point in the
equilibrium set where the equilibrium correspondence is (lower-hemi) continuous in ε.F o rc o m p l e t e n e s s ,
I will also give the relevant expressions for the case where ε>0.





H >κ , (15)
so that, for any tax τ ≤ δ and k =0 , the equilibrium wage is positive.
















H |j ∈ It
¢
as the fraction of entrepreneurs at time t who are high productivity. In the initial period,
t h ee c o n o m ys t a r t sw i t hµ0 =1 .T h el a wo fm o t i o no fµt is then given by:19
µt =
½
σHµt−1 + σL(1 − µt−1) if (13) does not hold
1 if (13) holds . (16)
This law of motion also implies that if (13) never holds, limt→∞µt = M<1, i.e., the frac-
tion of high-productivity entrepreneurs limits to the average fraction of high-productivity
agents in the population.
The following proposition summarizes the main results in this subsection (proof in the
text):
Proposition 1 Given a policy sequence {kt,τt}t=0,1,..., an equilibrium always exists. In
equilibrium, there are it =1 /λ entrepreneurs and each entrepreneur hires λ workers, and
undertakes the investment level given by (10), and the equilibrium wage is given by (14).
In addition:





t = AH, and the fraction of high-productivity entrepreneurs
is µt =1 ;




t, and the fraction of high-
productivity entrepreneurs is µt = σHµt−1 + σL(1 − µt−1);
• if (13) never holds, then the equilibrium has µt = σHµt−1 + σL(1 − µt−1) starting
with µ0 =1 ,a n ds a t i s ﬁes limt→∞ µt = M<1.
19For ε>0,t h i se q u a t i o ni sm o d i ﬁed to:
µt =
½
ε +( 1− ε)
¡
σHµt−1 + σL(1 − µt−1)
¢
if (13) does not hold
1 if (13) holds
173 Political Equilibrium
To obtain a full political equilibrium, we need to determine the policy sequence {kt,τt}t=0,1,....
I will consider two extreme cases:
1. Democracy: the policies kt and τt are determined by majoritarian voting, with each
agent having one vote.
2. Oligarchy (elite control): the policies kt and τt are determined by majoritarian
voting among the elite at time t.It a k et h ee l i t et ob et h o s ew h oh a v ei n h e r i t e da
ﬁrm from their parents, or in other words those with st =1 .
In this section, oligarchy is assumed to be "technological" in the sense that irrespective
of the exact political institutions, those with control of the productive resources of the
society and greater income have more say in political decision-making, and consequently,
policy choices reﬂect their preferences. In the next section, I analyze a model where
whether the society is democratic or oligarchic is determined in equilibrium.
3.1 Democracy
The timing of events implies that the tax rate at time t, τt, is decided after investment
decisions at time t, whereas the entry barriers are decided before. Both of these policy
decisions are made by majoritarian voting.20 Recall also that the assumption λ>2 above
ensures that non-elite agents are always in the majority.
At the time taxes are set, investments are sunk, agents have already made their oc-
cupation choices, and workers are in the majority. Therefore, taxes will be chosen to
maximize per capita transfers. We can use equation (12) to write tax revenues as:
Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt)=
½
1






t if τt ≤ δ
0 if τt >δ
, (17)
where ˆ τt is the tax rate expected by entrepreneurs and τt is the actual tax rate set by
voters. This expression takes into account that if τt >δ , entrepreneurs will hide their
output, and tax revenue will be 0. Tt is a function of the entry barrier, kt, since this can





At the time the entry barrier, kt,i ss e t ,a g e n t sh a v en o tm a d et h e i ro c c u p a t i o n a l




t = AL, know that
20Appendix A presents a more general version of the model, which has both policy choices made
simultaneously, and yields identical results to those in the text.
18they will always be workers, and thus simply receive the equilibrium wage and transfers.











t (kt | ˆ τt)+Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt), (18)
where b
j
t is the bequests he has inherited, and we
t (kt | ˆ τt) is the equilibrium wage given by
equation (14), but with the anticipated tax rate ˆ τt replacing the actual tax rate (this is
because the labor market clears before tax decisions, so we
t is conditioned on the expected
tax rate, ˆ τt; in equilibrium, naturally, τt =ˆ τt). Thus:
w
e




(1 − ˆ τt)
1/αA
H − κ − kt;0
¾
. (19)




t = AH,m a yb e c o m e
entrepreneurs, but as the above analysis shows, in this case, Π
¡






0, so their utility is also given by (18). Consequently, all non-elite agents will choose kt
to maximize we
t (kt | ˆ τt)+Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt). Since the preferences of all non-elite agents are
the same and they are in the majority, the democratic equilibrium will maximize these
preferences. This analysis shows that a democratic equilibrium can be deﬁned as:



































t (kt | ˆ τt)+Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt).
Because taxes are set after investment decisions, workers prefer τt = δ to maximize the
redistribution of income from the entrepreneurs to themselves–Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt) is maximized
at τt = δ and we
t (kt | ˆ τt) does not depend on τt.21
21The results are identical when taxes are on income rather than output. In this case, the objective
function of the median voter would be: (1 − τt)we
t (kt | ˆ τt)+Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt),w i t hTt (kt,τt | ˆ τt) unchanged
(this is because tax revenues now include taxes from wage income, but this is oﬀset by the lower tax
revenue from entrepreneurs, who are now paying taxes only on their net income, i.e., output minus wage
bill). It can be veriﬁed that this expression is still maximized at τt = δ. To see this note that the
derivative of this expression with respect to τt is
1
1 − α








t (kt | ˆ τt),






t ≥ 0. Therefore,
1





t, implying that voters would like as high a tax rate as possible, i.e., τt = δ.
19Inspection of (17) and (19) shows that wages and tax revenue are both maximized
when kt =0 , so the democratic equilibrium will not impose any entry barriers. This
is intuitive: workers have nothing to gain by protecting incumbents, and a lot to lose,
since such protection reduces labor demand and wages. Since there are no entry barriers,





t = AH. The following proposition therefore follows immediately (proof in the text):
Proposition 2 A democratic equilibrium always features τt = δ and kt =0 ,a n di
j
t =1
if and only if a
j
































Notice that in the ﬁrst line of (20), the ﬁrst term is total production net of taxes,
and the second term is tax revenue at the rate τt = δ.22 An important feature of this
equilibrium is that aggregate output is constant over time, which will contrast with the
oligarchic equilibrium.
Finally, note that since
Π
¡















high-productivity agents are indiﬀerent between entrepreneurship and production work.
Nevertheless, entrepreneurs earn greater incomes to compensate them for the non-pecuniary
costs of entrepreneurship. In fact, in all periods, production workers have a post-tax in-














22The expression above refers to total output, before the costs of investment, e, and operation,
κ, have been subtracted. Output net of these costs is given by α(1 − δ)1/αAH/(1 − α)+αδ(1 −
δ)(1−α)/αAH/(1 − α) − κ.
23To obtain (21), use the expression for the equilibrium wage, (19) and tax revenues, (17), with τ =
ˆ τ = δ. To obtain (22), use the production function (3) with equilibrium factor demands (9) and (10),
and the fact that output is taxed at the rate τ =ˆ τ = δ, then subtract the total wage bill using (19), and
add Ww, which is what the entrepreneur receives as a worker himself.
20while each entrepreneur receives:
W
e =( 1− δ)
1/αA




In oligarchy, only existing entrepreneurs (agents with s
j
t =1 ) participate in the political
process, and policies are determined by majoritarian voting among this set of agents. The
nature of the oligarchic equilibrium is simpliﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h eo n l yh e t e r o g e n e i t y
within the elite is between high-productivity and low-productivity agents. This implies
that majoritarian voting will lead to the policies most preferred by whichever group is in
the majority within the elite.
To state this formally, let ¯ µt be the fraction of high-productivity agents among those
with st =1 .T h i si sd i ﬀerent from µt, which refers to the entrepreneurs, i.e., those with
it =1 ,w h e r e a s¯ µt refers to the agents in the elite, i.e., those with st =1 .N o t i c et h a ti f
an agent st =1chooses it =0and does not become an entrepreneur, he is still in the elite
at time t, and thus takes part in the determination of the tax rate, though his oﬀspring
will not be in the elite.24
In addition, note that the most preferred policies of an elite agent with productivity
a
j



















t (kt | ˆ τt)+Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt),
where b
j
t is the bequest the agent has inherited, the Π function, from (5) above, denotes
the net return to entrepreneurship, we
t, given by (19), is the equilibrium wage rate and
Tt, given by (17), denotes transfers. This expression incorporates the fact that the agent
will become an entrepreneur only if the net return to entrepreneurship is non-negative.
Then let us deﬁne:




























24An alternative modeling assumption would be to limit the decision on the tax rate only to agents
with it =1 .I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that the equilibrium in this case is identical to the non-cycling equilibrium
characterized here (i.e., it does not contain cycles even when condition (24) holds).





















t (kt | ˆ τt)+Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt)
ª
;





















t (kt | ˆ τt)+Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt)
ª
,
where Tt (kt,τt | ˆ τt) is given by (17) and we
t (kt | ˆ τt) is given by (19).
To characterize the oligarchic equilibrium, let us ﬁrst consider the preferences of high-




t = AH). Since these agents will remain as
an entrepreneur, they would always like the wage and taxes to be as low as possible, i.e.,
ˆ τt =0 . Equilibrium wage, given in (19), will be minimized at we




1−α(1 − ˆ τt)1/αAH − κ,∞
¢
. Without loss of any generality, I focus on a particular
point in this set,






H − κ. (23)





t = AL). His payoﬀ is maximized either by kt = kE and τt =0 ,w h e n





λ (plus 0 wage and 0
redistribution). Or it is maximized by kt =0and τt = δ, when he chooses to become a
worker receiving income α
1−α(1 − δ)1/αAH − κ+ δ










proﬁts from entrepreneurship are greater, and low-productivity elites prefer the ﬁrst op-
tion.25 Therefore, when (24) holds, both low-productivity and high-productivity elites
have the same preferences over policies, and vote for kt = kE and τt =0 . This combina-
tion is the oligarchic equilibrium, and results in equilibrium wages we
t =0 .26












25Note that if the policy of kt = kE and τt =0is imposed, the low-productivity elite would always prefer
to remain in entrepreneurship. However, when deciding policies, the choice is between entrepreneurship
with kt = kE and τt =0 , and production work with kt =0and τt = δ.
26This result also shows that even if taxes that only apply to labor income and transfers directed only
t ot h ee l i t ew e r ea l l o w e d ,t h e r ew o u l db en on e e df o rt h ee l i t et ou s et h e m ,s i n c ew a g e sa r ea l r e a d ya t
their minimum value.
22where µt = σHµt−1 +σL(1−µt−1) as given by (16), with µ0 =1 .S i n c eµt is a decreasing
sequence converging to M, aggregate output Y E
















The reason for this is that as time goes by, the comparative advantage of the members
of the elite in entrepreneurship gradually disappears because of the imperfect correlation
between parents’ and children’s talents.
Another important feature of this equilibrium is that there is a high degree of (earn-
ings) inequality. Wages are equal to 0, while entrepreneurs earn positive proﬁts–in fact,
each entrepreneur earns λY E
t , and their total earnings equal aggregate output. This
contrasts with relative equality in democracy.
Alternately, when (24) does not hold, low-productivity elites have diﬀerent policy
preferences from high-productivity elites. Therefore, the equilibrium depends on the
ratio of high-productivity vs. low-productivity elites, i.e., on ¯ µt.W h e n¯ µt ≥ 1/2,h i g h -
productivity elites are pivotal and the above characterization applies–i.e., ˆ kt = kE and
ˆ τt =0 . In contrast, when ¯ µt < 1/2, low-productivity elites are in the majority and
equilibrium policies are ˆ kt =0and ˆ τt = δ. Therefore, at date t, the equilibrium will
be identical to the democratic equilibrium. However, entry of high-productivity agents
into entrepreneurship when ˆ kt =0implies that µt =1 . Then provided that σH > 1/2,
¯ µt+1 will be greater than 1/2 and high-productivity elites will be in the majority again at
time t +1 , and the equilibrium will revert back to the sclerotic one with entry barriers
kE and 0 taxes. Therefore, when (24) does not hold, the equilibrium will be cyclic with
periodicity ˆ t satisfying ˆ t =m i nt ∈ N :¯ µt < 1/2. Alternatively, using the fact that ¯ µt = µt
for all t<ˆ t, ˆ t can be deﬁned as ˆ t =m i nt ∈ N : µt−1 <
1/2−σL
σH−σL.28 If, on the other hand,
σH ≤ 1/2,t h e ne v e na tt+1low-productivity agents will be the majority within the elite,
and will prefer kt =0and τt = δ, so the oligarchic equilibrium will be identical to the
democratic one.
Therefore, we have the following proposition (proof in the text):
Proposition 3 If (24) holds, then the oligarchic equilibrium has τt =0and kt = kE
as given by (23), and the equilibrium is always sclerotic and features we
t =0 .A g g r e -
27For the case where ε>0,w eh a v eµt = ε +( 1− ε)
¡






(1 − µt) 1









28In other words, this is the level of µt−1 such that were the equilibrium to remain sclerotic, µt would
be less than 1/2 for the ﬁrst time at t = ˆ t. But because the equilibrium switches to the entry equilibrium,
we have µˆ t =1while ¯ µˆ t < 1/2.




t = Y E
∞ as given by (26).
If (24) does not hold and σH > 1/2, then the oligarchic equilibrium is cyclic. The
economy starts with µ0 =1 ,a n dµt satisﬁes the law of motion µt = σHµt−1+σL(1−µt−1)
until t = ˆ t where ˆ t is deﬁned as ˆ t =m i nt ∈ N : µt−1 <
1/2−σL
σH−σL. The equilibrium has τt =0
and kt = kE as given by (23) if t 6= nˆ t for any n ∈ N,a n dτt = δ and kt =0if t = nˆ t for
some n ∈ N. Aggregate output is given by (25) with µt = σHµt−1 +σL(1−µt−1) if t 6= nˆ t
for any n ∈ N,a n dµt =1if t = nˆ t for some n ∈ N, so it declines during all periods where
t 6= nˆ t,a n dj u m p su pt o 1
1−αAH when t = nˆ t for some n ∈ N.
If (24) does not hold and σH ≤ 1/2, then the oligarchic equilibrium is identical to the
democratic equilibrium in Proposition 2.
3.3 Comparison Between Democracy and Oligarchy
The last two subsections highlighted a number of diﬀerences between democratic and
oligarchic equilibria. This subsection compares aggregate output and its dynamics in the
democratic and oligarchic equilibria.29 To simplify the discussion, I focus on the case
where (24) holds, so that the oligarchic equilibrium does not have cycles.
The ﬁrst important result is that aggregate output in the initial period of the oligarchic
equilibrium, i.e., Y E
0 , is greater than the constant level of output in the democratic equi-















Therefore, for all δ>0, oligarchy initially generates greater output than democracy,
because it is protecting the property rights of entrepreneurs.30 However, the analysis also
shows that Y E
t declines over time, while Y D is constant. Consequently, the oligarchic
economy may subsequently fall behind the democratic society. Whether it does so or not
depends on whether Y D is greater than Y E
∞ as given by (26). This will be the case if
(1 − δ)
1−α
α AH/(1 − α) >
¡
AL + M(AH − AL)
¢












29It can be veriﬁed that all the results here also hold for the comparison of net output levels.
30The result that the oligarchic equilibrium always generates greater output than the democratic equi-
librium at time t =0is a consequence of the assumption that the only source of distortion in oligarchy
is the entry barriers. In practice, an oligarchic society could pursue other distortionary policies to reduce
wages and increase proﬁts, in which case it might generate lower output than a democratic society even
at time t =0 .
24If condition (27) holds, then at some point the democratic society will overtake ("leapfrog")
the oligarchic society. (27) is more likely to hold when δ, AL/AH and M are low. In other
words, if democracy will pursue highly "populist" policies imposing high taxes on busi-
nesses in order to redistribute income to the poor, and if the cost of misallocation of talent
in the economy is low, then the oligarchic equilibrium always generates greater output.
The cost of misallocation of talent will be low, in turn, when either the skill gap between
low and high-productivity entrepreneurs is limited (AL/AH high) or when the population
average of high-productivity agents is high (M high). On the other hand, if the extent
of taxation in democracy is limited and the failure to allocate the right agents to en-














Figure 4: Comparison of aggregate output in democracy and oligarchy. The dashed
curve depicts output in oligarchy when (27) holds, and the solid line when it does not.
31Notice that if (24) does not hold and the oligarchic equilibrium is cyclic, then it generates greater
income than the case discussed in the text. More formally, let Y E
t be the aggregate equilibrium output
in the non-cyclic oligarchic equilibrium at time t,a n d˜ Y E
t be the aggregate equilibrium output in the
cyclic oligarchic equilibrium. Suppose that condition (24) holds as an equality, so that both the non-
cyclic and the cyclic equilibria exist. Then, we have that ˜ Y E
t = Y E
t for all t<ˆ t and ˜ Y E
t >YE
t for all
t ≥ ˆ t. Nevertheless, democracy may still generate greater aggregate output than the cyclic oligarchic
equilibrium. In other words, ˜ Y E
t <Y D is still possible, though more diﬃcult (and naturally, this will
only be the case if ˜ Y E
ˆ t−1 <YD,w h e r e ,b yd e ﬁnition, ˜ Y E
ˆ t−1 is the minimum aggregate output level reached
by the cyclic oligarchic equilibrium).
25Figure 4 illustrates both of these possibilities diagrammatically. The thick ﬂat line
shows the level of aggregate output in democracy, Y D. The other two curves depict the
level of output in oligarchy, Y E
t , as a function of time for the case where (27) holds and
for the case where it does not. Both of these curves asymptote to some limit, either Y E
∞
or Y 0E
∞ , which may lie below or above Y D. The dashed curve shows the case where (27)
holds, so after a while (in the ﬁgure after date t0), oligarchy generates less output than
democracy. When (27) does not hold, the solid curve applies, and aggregate output in
oligarchy asymptotes to a level higher than Y D.
It is also useful to point out that some alternative arrangements would dominate
both democracy and oligarchy in terms of aggregate output performance. For example,
a society may restrict the amount to redistribution by placing a constitutional limit on
taxation, and let the decisions on entry barriers be made democratically. Alternately, it
may prevent entry barriers constitutionally, and place the taxation decisions in the hands
of the oligarchy. The perspective here is that these arrangements are not possible in
practice because of the inherent commitment problem in politics: those with the political
power in their hands make the policy decisions, and previous promises are not necessarily
credible. Consequently, it is not possible to give political power to incumbent producers,
and then expect them not to use their political power to erect entry barriers, or vest
political power with the poorer agents and expect them not to favor redistribution.
What about the preferences of diﬀerent groups over regimes? It is clear that non-elites
are always better oﬀ in democracy than in oligarchy. To see this, note that non-elites





t. By comparison, Assumption (15) guarantees that the wage rate in democracy, Ww,
given by (21), is positive, so the same agent will have utility b
j
t + Ww >b
j
t.T h e r e f o r e ,
non-elites are always better oﬀ in democracy. In contrast, as long as condition (24) holds,
all elites prefer the oligarchic solution, since, as shown above, they all vote for τt =0and
kt = kE (if this condition does not hold, high-productivity elites prefer oligarchy, while
low-productivity elites prefer democracy). There is therefore a conﬂict between the elites
and non-elites over the type of political regime.
Oligarchy also typically generates more inequality relative to democracy. Recall that in
democracy, workers’ and entrepreneurs’ incomes are given by (21) and (22). In contrast, in
the non-cyclic oligarchic equilibrium, entrepreneurs (elites) erect entry barriers to depress
labor demand and wages, and consequently, workers earn we
t =0 , while entrepreneurs earn
26WE
t = λY E
t .32 The analysis also reveals that there is greater social mobility in democracy
than in oligarchy: in oligarchy, the equilibrium is sclerotic and the same dynasties run the
ﬁrms, whereas in democracy there is continuous churning in the ranks of entrepreneurship
and production work.
3.4 New Technologies
The Introduction discussed the possibility of a more democratic society, such as the United
States at the end of the eighteenth century, adapting better to the arrival of new invest-
ment or technological opportunities than an oligarchy, such as those in the Caribbean.
The model here also provides a potential explanation for this pattern.
Suppose that at some date t0 > 0 a new technology arrives exogenously.33 Let us think
















where ψ>1 and ˆ a
j
t is the talent of this entrepreneur with the new technology. Therefore,





























The cost of operating this technology is assumed to be the same as the old technology,
κλ. Also to simplify the discussion, assume that the law of motion of ˆ a
j
t is similar to that
of a
j
t,g i v e nb y
32The ratio of elite to non-elite income is always higher in oligarchy. The diﬀerence in incomes is also





in oligarchy, and to (1 − δ)
1/α AHλ +κλ in democracy. The income gap in democracy, as we saw above,
compensates entrepreneurs for the costs of eﬀort. It can be veriﬁed that as long as Y E
t ≥ Y D,t h e
income gap is greater in oligarchy than in democracy. However, if Y E
t is much smaller than Y D,t h e
converse may be the case. This happens only for extreme parameter values: when AL is very low, so that
aggregate income and thus entrepreneurial proﬁts are low in oligarchy, while δ is low and κ is high so












is suﬃcient (but not necessary) to ensure that the income gap between entrepreneurs and workers is
always greater in oligarchy than in democracy (also note that this condition is compatible with (27)).
33An interesting question is whether democratic and oligarchic societies would have diﬀerent propen-








AH with probability σH if ˆ a
j
t = AH
AH with probability σL if ˆ a
j
t = AL
AL with probability 1 − σH if ˆ a
j
t = AH












= M for any t,˜ t and a
j
˜ t. In other words, ˆ a
j
t,a n d
in particular ˆ a
j
t0, is independent of past and future a
j
t’s. This implies that ˆ a
j
t0 = AH
with probability M and ˆ a
j
t0 = AL with probability 1 − M irrespective of the talent of
the individual with the old technology. This is reasonable since new technologies exploit
diﬀerent skills and create diﬀerent comparative advantages than the old ones.
It is straightforward to see that the structure of the democratic equilibrium is not
aﬀected, and at the time t0, agents with comparative advantage for the new technology









In contrast, in oligarchy, the elites are in power at time t0, and as long as a modiﬁed form
of condition (24) is satisﬁed, they would like to remain the entrepreneurs even if they






α(1 − δ)1/α + δ(1 − δ)(1−α)/α¤
ψAH − κ
α
1−α max{ψAL,A H} − κ
. (29)
It states that remaining a low-productivity entrepreneur with the new technology, with
productivity ψAL, or a high-productivity entrepreneur with the old technology, with pro-
ductivity AH, in both cases protected by maximum entry barriers, is preferable to working
at the competitive wage and receiving redistribution at the rate δ in the entry equilibrium
(which gives an income of 1
1−α
£
α(1 − δ)1/α + δ(1 − δ)(1−α)/α¤
ψAH − κ). As long as (29)
is satisﬁed, the oligarchic equilibrium will remain sclerotic even after the arrival of the
new technology.
How aggregate output in the oligarchic equilibrium changes after date t0 depends on
whether ψAL >A H or not. If it is, then all incumbents switch to the new technology and

















t are independent, so applying
the weak law of large numbers, exactly a fraction M of the elite have high productivity
with the new technology, and the remainder have low productivity.
28If, on the other hand, ψAL <A H, then those elites who have high productivity with
the old technology but turn out to have low productivity with the new technology prefer








H + µt (1 − M)A
H +( 1− µt)(1− M)ψA
L¤
,
with µt given by the same process as before, (16). Intuitively, now the members of the elite
who have high productivity with the new technology and those who have low productivity
with the old technology switch to the new technology, while those with high productivity
with the old and low productivity with the new remain with the old technology (they
switch to new technology only when they lose their high-productivity status with the old
technology). As a result, we have that ˜ Y E
t , just like Y E
t before, is decreasing over time,




MψAH + M (1 − M)AH +( 1− M)
2 ψAL¤
.
More important for the focus here, it is easy to verify that, as long as Y E
∞ ≤ Y D,t h e
gap ˆ Y D− ˆ Y E or ˆ Y D− ˜ Y E
t (or whichever is relevant) is always greater than the output gap
before the arrival of the new technology, Y D−Y E
t (for t>t 0). In other words, the arrival of
the new technology creates a further advantage for the democratic society. In fact, it may
h a v eb e e nt h ec a s et h a tY D − Y E
t < 0, i.e., before the arrival of the new technology, the
oligarchic society was richer than the democratic society, but the ranking is reversed after
the arrival of the new technology at date t0. Intuitively, this is because the democratic
society immediately makes full use of the new technology by allowing those who have a
comparative advantage to enter entrepreneurship, while the oligarchic society typically
fails to do so, and therefore has greater diﬃculty adapting to technological change.34
4 Regime Changes
The previous section characterized the political equilibrium under two diﬀerent scenarios;
democracy and oligarchy. Which political system prevails in a given society was treated
as exogenous. Why are certain societies democratic, while others are more oligarchic,
with the elite in control of political power? One possibility at this point is to appeal to
historical accident, while another is to construct a "behind-the-veil" argument, whereby
whichever political system leads to greater eﬃciency or ex ante utility would prevail. Nei-
ther of these two approaches are entirely satisfactory, however. First, since the prevailing
34In practice, it may also be the case that entrepreneurial talent matters more for new technologies
than for old technologies, creating yet another reason for democratic societies to take better advantage
of new technologies.
29political regime inﬂuences economic outcomes, rational agents should have preferences
over these regimes as well, thus boding against a view which treats diﬀerences in regimes
as exogenous. Second, political regimes matter precisely because they regulate the conﬂict
of interest between diﬀerent groups (in this context, between workers and entrepreneurs).
The behind-the-veil argument is unsatisfactory, since it recognizes and models this conﬂict
to determine the equilibrium within a particular regime, but then ignores it when there
is a choice of regime. Finally, neither of these two approaches provide a framework for
analyzing changes in regime, which are ubiquitous. A more satisfactory approach would
be to let the same trade-oﬀs emphasized above also aﬀect which regimes will emerge and
persist in equilibrium. In this section, I make a preliminary attempt in this direction.35
I consider an economy where non-elites would like to switch from oligarchy to democ-
racy, while elites would like to preserve the oligarchic system. How will these conﬂicting
interests be mediated? A plausible answer is that there is no easy compromise,36 and
whichever group is politically or militarily more powerful will prevail. This is the perspec-
tive adopted in this section, and the political or military power of a group is linked to its
economic power. In other words, in the conﬂict between the elites and the non-elites, the
likelihood that the elite will prevail is increasing in their relative economic strength or in
their relative wealth. This assumption is plausible: a non-democratic regime often trans-
forms itself into a more democratic one in the face of threats or unrest, and the degree
to which the regime will be able to protect itself depends on the resources available to it
(e.g., see the discussion in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2003).
4.1 Basic Model
Suppose that the society starts as an oligarchy, and if it switches to democracy, it re-
mains democratic thereafter. I model the eﬀect of economic power on political power
in a reduced-form way, and assume that the probability that an oligarchy switches to
democracy is
pt = p(∆Bt),
35See Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2003) for a class of models of equilibrium political institutions,
with an emphasis on shifts in political power between poorer and richer segments of the society. These
models do not consider the economic trade-oﬀs between distortionary taxation and entry barriers.
36It may be argued that there should be room for compromise, since one of the regimes generates
greater aggregate income (eﬃciency), and this income can be redistricted in a way to make all parties
better oﬀ. This type of argument ignores the constraints that commitment problems place on feasible





















is the per capita wealth diﬀerence between the elites and the non-elites (workers) at
the beginning of period t.37 I assume that regime change takes place immediately at
the beginning of the period. Using Dt =0to denote oligarchy and Dt =1to denote






0 with probability 1 − p(∆Bt) if Dt−1 =0
1 with probability p(∆Bt) if Dt−1 =0
1 if Dt−1 =1
. (31)
The assumption that economic power buys political power is equivalent to p(·) being
decreasing. In the analysis below, I allow p(·) to be non-increasing.
Deﬁnition (Equilibrium With Regime Changes) An equilibrium with regime changes



























is the oligarchic equilibrium policy sequence, and




is the democratic equilibrium policy sequence,









t−1 is given by (25).
This deﬁnition makes use of the fact that since Dt =0 , b
j
0 =0for all j and we
t =0in
an oligarchic equilibrium, BW
t =0 ,t h u s∆Bt = BE
t . It then uses the savings rule in (2)
and the fact that in oligarchy each member of the the elite earns an income of λY E
t .
37Note that an alternative would have been to make political power a function of the relative wealth
levels of elites and workers. In the current model, this is not possible, since the long-run wealth level of
workers is 0 even if they start with positive wealth. To accommodate this possibility, we can assume that
the minimum wage is positive, say w > 0, for example because of an outside option. In this case, it can
be shown that if all agents also start with positive wealth, the ratio of elite wealth to worker wealth will
ﬁrst increase and then decline. The result that there can be multiple steady-state equilibria derived in
Proposition 5 below generalizes irrespective of whether or not the relevant measure of inequality increases
monotonically in oligarchy–it only relies on the feature that there is greater inequality in oligarchy than
in democracy.
31Now imagine the equilibrium path of this economy starting at t =0 . To simplify the
discussion, suppose that condition (24) is satisﬁed, so that the oligarchic equilibrium is
not cyclic. Since each agent is imperfectly altruistic, the possibility of regime change in
the future does not aﬀect behavior, so the equilibria characterized above as a function of
the political regime continue to apply. Therefore, at t =0 ,w ew i l lh a v et h eo l i g a r c h i c
equilibrium, with no redistribution and 0 wages, and so WE
0 = λY E
0 and WW
0 =0 ,w h e r e
WE
0 and WW
0 denote the per capita incomes of elites and non-elites respectively, and Y E
0
is given by (25). Given the savings rule implied by (2), we therefore have
B
E
1 = ∆B1 = βλY
E
0 .
With the same argument, if the society remains oligarchic, we have
B
E

















t−n.( 3 2 )
It is clear that ∆Bt is an increasing sequence, and so pt will be a non-increasing sequence.
Therefore, the longer the society remains as an oligarchy, the bigger the wealth gap










∞ is given by (26). Now two interesting cases can be distinguished:38 (1) There




=0 .( 2 ) p(∆B∞) > 0. In the former case, there
also exists ¯ t such that for all t ≥ ¯ t,w eh a v e∆Bt ≥ ∆ ¯ B, so if the economy does not switch
to democracy before ¯ t, it will be permanently stuck in oligarchy. In the second case, as
time passes, the economy will switch out of oligarchy into democracy with probability 1.
The next proposition summarizes the equilibrium path with potential regime changes
(proof in the text):
Proposition 4 In the economy described above, the equilibrium with regime change is
as follows: the economy starts with D0 =0and the oligarchic equilibrium, and transitions
38A third possibility is limt→∞ p(∆Bt)=0 , in which case the nature of the limiting equilibrium
depends on the rate at which p(∆Bt) converges to 0.






t−n,a n dr e m a i n sd e m o c r a t i ct hereafter. In addition:




=0where ∆B∞ is given
by (33), and let ¯ t =m i nt ∈ N : ∆Bt ≥ ∆ ¯ B. If the economy remains oligarchic until
¯ t, then it will always remain oligarchic–i.e., if D¯ t =0 , then Dt =0for all t>¯ t;
• suppose that p(∆B∞) > 0, then the society will become democratic at some point,
i.e., Pr(limt→∞ Dt =1 )=1 .
4.2 Path Dependence and Instability
Finally, consider a generalization of the above framework where democratic societies can
switch back to oligarchy, and to simplify the discussion, assume that if there is a switch to
oligarchy, the agents with s
j
1 =1(i.e., the initial elite) become the elite.39 In particular,
assume that when democratic, a society becomes oligarchic with probability
qt = q(∆Bt)
where now q(·) is a non-decreasing function, q(0) = 0,a n d∆Bt now refers to the wealth
gap between the initial elite (those with s
j
1 =1 ) and the initial non-elite (those with
s
j












tdj/ (1 − λ).





0 with probability 1 − p(∆Bt) if Dt−1 =0
1 with probability p(∆Bt) if Dt−1 =0
0 with probability q(∆Bt) if Dt−1 =1
1 with probability 1 − q(∆Bt) if Dt−1 =1
, (34)









β∆Bt−1 if Dt−1 =1 , (35)
which exploits the fact that after the switch to democracy, by the weak law of large
numbers, a fraction M of the previous elites and a fraction M of the previous non-elites
will become entrepreneurs and earn the higher income We
t given by (22), so the average
39The alternative would be for the agents who currently have st =1to become the elite. This would
require us to keep track of the entire wealth distribution, which becomes quite involved.
33incomes of previous elites and non-elites will be equal, and the only source of wealth
diﬀerences among individuals is diﬀerences in their bequests, i.e., "initial" conditions.
The deﬁnition of an equilibrium with regime change is modiﬁed in a straightforward
way by replacing (31) with (34). In addition, in order to provide a simple example of path
dependence, I now allow the society to start as democratic, i.e., with D0 =1 .
Rather than providing a full description of all potential types of equilibria, here I focus
on certain cases of interest, which are summarized in the following proposition:





given by (33) and let ¯ t =m i nt ∈ N : ∆Bt ≥ ∆ ¯ B with ∆Bt given by (32), and that there




=0 ,a n dl e t˜ t(t0)=m i nt ∈ N : ∆Bt ≤ ∆ ˜ B where ∆Bt
is given by (35) starting at t = t0 with ∆Bt0 given by (32). Then:
• If D0 =1 ,t h e nDt =1for all t; i.e., if a society starts as democratic, it will remain
democratic thereafter.
• If D0 =0and Dt0 =1for the ﬁrst time in t0,a n dDt =1for all t ∈
£
t0,t 0 + ˜ t(t0)
¤
,
then Dt =1for all t ≥ t0; i.e., if a society becomes democratic at t0 and remains
democratic for ˜ t(t0) periods, it will remain democratic thereafter.
• If D0 =0and Dt =0for all t ≤ ¯ t,t h e nDt =0for all t; i.e., if a society starts
oligarchic and remains oligarchic until ¯ t, then it will always remain oligarchic.
• If D0 =0and Dt0 =1 , then the probability of switching back to oligarchy for the
ﬁr s tt i m ea tt i m et>t 0 after the switch to democracy at t0, Qt|t0 is non-increasing
in t and non-decreasing in t0,w i t hlimt→∞Qt|t0 =0 –i.e., a society faces the highest
probability of switching back to oligarchy immediately after the switch from oli-
garchy to democracy, and this probability is higher if it has spent a longer time in
oligarchy.
The ﬁrst three parts of the proposition follow from the preceding discussion. To see
why the last part is correct, note that a greater t0 implies that the society spent longer
in oligarchy, so ∆Bt, and hence the probability of switching back to oligarchy, is higher.
Ag r e a t e rt given t0, on the other hand, corresponds to the society having spent a longer
time in democracy, reducing the wealth gap between the initial elites and non-elites, and
consequently, the probability of switchback to oligarchy. Moreover, as t−t0 →∞ ,e q u a t i o n
(35) implies that ∆Bt → 0,s oq(∆Bt) → 0.
34There are two interesting results contained in this proposition. The ﬁrst is the pos-
sibility of path dependence. Of two identical societies, if one starts oligarchic and the
other as democratic, they can follow very diﬀerent political and economic trajectories.
With the assumption that q(0) = 0, the initial democracy will always remain democratic,
generate an income level Y D and an equal distribution of income, ensuring that ∆Bt =0
and therefore q =0 . On the other hand, if it starts oligarchic, it will follow the oligarchic
equilibrium, with an unequal distribution of income. The greater income of the elites
will enable them to have the power to sustain the oligarchic equilibrium, and if there is
no transition to democracy until some point, date ¯ t (which may be t =0 ), they will be
suﬃciently richer than workers to be able to sustain the oligarchic regime forever. This
type of path dependence provides a potential explanation for the diﬀerent development
experiences in the Americas suggested by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) and Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2002). Similar path dependence will also result if a society is
originally an oligarchy, but then switches to democracy and remains democratic for a
suﬃciently long period of time, so that inequality created during the oligarchic phase
diminishes signiﬁcantly and democracy becomes fully consolidated.40
Another interesting result is that a democracy is predicted to be most susceptible to
collapse right after transition from oligarchy to democracy, because, at this point, the
previous elites are still substantially richer than the workers. As time goes by the wealth
gap will decline, and democracy will become more stable. Moreover, the longer lived is
oligarchy before the switch to democracy, the larger is the wealth gap between the elites
and the workers, and the less stable is democracy.
5C o n c l u s i o n
There is now a general consensus that "institutions" have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on economic
development. But we are far from understanding what these institutions are. Many
economists and political scientists believe that the extent of property rights enforcement
is an important element of this set of institutions, but even here there are fundamental
unanswered questions. Most notably, whose property rights should be protected? This
question becomes particularly pertinent when there is a conﬂict between protecting the
property rights of various diﬀerent groups.
40See also Benabou (2000) for a model featuring multiple steady-state equilibria, one with high in-
equality and policies that are more favorable to the rich, and another with lower inequality and greater
redistribution towards the poor.
35This paper develops a model where protecting the property rights of current producers
comes at the cost of weakening the property rights of future producers. This is because
eﬀective protection of the property rights of current producers requires them to have
political power, which they can use to erect entry barriers, violating the property rights
of future producers. This pattern of well-enforced property rights for current producers
and monopoly-creating entry barriers in an oligarchic society contrasts with relatively
high taxes on current producers but low entry barriers in a democratic society.
I develop a simple framework to analyze the trade-oﬀ between these two diﬀerent forms
of property rights enforcement. I show that an oligarchic society ﬁrst generates greater
eﬃciency, because agents who are selected into entrepreneurship are often those with a
comparative advantage in that sector and oligarchy avoids the distortion eﬀects of redis-
tributive taxation. But, as time goes by and comparative advantage in entrepreneurship
shifts away from the incumbents to new agents, the allocation of resources in oligarchy
worsens. Contrasting with this, democracy creates distortions because of the disincentive
eﬀects of taxation, but these distortions do not worsen over time. Therefore, a possible
path of development for an oligarchic society is to ﬁrst rise and then fall relative to a
more democratic/open society.
The model therefore provides a potential explanation for relatively high growth rates
of many societies with oligarchic features, both historically and during the postwar era,
but also suggests a reason for why they often run into signiﬁcant growth slowdowns. In
addition, it predicts that oligarchic societies may fail to take advantage of new growth op-
portunities, as was the case with the highly oligarchic and relatively prosperous Caribbean
plantation economies, which failed to invest in industry and new technology, while the
initially-less-prosperous North American colonies industrialized.
I also use this framework to discuss endogenous regime transitions, in particular,
to highlight the possibility of path dependence. Path dependence arises because those
enriched by the oligarchic regime can use their resources to sustain the system that serves
their interests. As a result, two otherwise identical societies that start with diﬀerent
political regimes may generate signiﬁcantly diﬀerent income distributions, which in turn
sustain diﬀerent political regimes and hence economic outcomes.
The paper also suggests a number of areas for future research. On the theoretical side,
a number of questions are left open. First, the model assumes that members of the elite
can only keep their status by managing their own ﬁrms, even if they have low-productivity.
In practice, delegating managerial positions to more productive agents is an option. In-
36corporating this possibility into the current framework is relatively straightforward, but
there might also be more interesting angles to study. For example, when entry barri-
ers are suﬃciently high, high-skill individuals may not start their own businesses, thus
creating a suﬃcient pool of managerial talent, and indirectly increasing the proﬁtability
and durability of an oligarchic regime. Second, in a world with innovations and creative
destruction, suﬃciently successful (creative) entrepreneurs may possess the economic and
political resources to buy protection and entry barriers, thus creating another link be-
tween initial success and later stagnation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
model of politics in this paper is rudimentary. More micro-founded models of how eco-
nomic power buys political power need to be developed in future work. On the empirical
side, it is important to further investigate whether distortions in oligarchic societies are
introduced by entry barriers, while those in democracies are caused by anti-business and
redistributive policies, and whether there are any systematic patterns related to the rise
and decline of oligarchies diﬀerent from the dynamics of democratic societies.
376 Appendix: A More General Model
Here I brieﬂy outline a simple generalization which ensures that even if voters choose taxes
at the beginning of the period, i.e., before investment decisions, they would set a positive
tax rate, and all the results of the main analysis generalize. In addition, in this model,
we can dispense with the hiding decisions, h
j
t, since the tax rate preferred by the median
voter, which trades oﬀ redistribution versus disincentive eﬀects, is always less than 1.
Consider an economy similar to the one analyzed above, with the same technology and
preferences, but with three levels of productivity, AV ≥ AH >A L. The law of motion of
productivity is a generalization of (8). Deﬁne MV as the fraction of very high-productivity
agents in the society and MH as the fraction of high-productivity agents. Assume that
λM






which implies that the "marginal" entrepreneur is the high-productivity type, because,
even if there are no entry barriers, the very high-productivity entrepreneurs by themselves
cannot hire the entire labor force.








2. The entry barrier for new entrepreneurs kt and the tax rate, τt, are set.
















5. The labor market clearing wage rate, wt, is determined.









Most importantly, taxes, τt, are now set before the investment decisions, exactly at
t h es a m et i m ea st h ee n t r yb a r r i e r s ,kt. Moreover, there is no hiding decision (in fact, no
commitment problem).
Assumption (A1) implies that, in democracy, the equilibrium wage will be
w
e
















38where ¯ A is a weighted average of AV and AH,r e ﬂecting the ratio of very high to high
productivity entrepreneurs. In particular,









Next note that in democracy, i.e., once entry barriers are 0, the preferences of agents with










α ¯ A, (A2)
because, in equilibrium, their utility is given by the wage rate plus redistribution (plus
the bequest they have inherited)–agents with a
j
t = AH may become entrepreneurs, but
they receive the same utility in this case. Since MV < 1/2, the democratic tax rate will
















α −1 ¯ A ≤ 0 and τ ≥ 0
with complementary slackness. Inspection of this condition shows that if ¯ A = AH,t h e n
τ =0 ,w h i c hj u s t i ﬁes the claim made in footnote 17. However, as long as ¯ A>A H,t h e
solution to this problem is strictly positive, and voters set a positive tax rate,
τ
d =
¯ A − AH
¯ A/α − AH < 1, (A3)
to redistribute income from the entrepreneurs to themselves.
The rest of the analysis in the text applies, with the democratic equilibrium tax rate










































∞ is lower than Y D or not is determined by a similar analysis to that in
the text, with the only interesting twist being that now the equilibrium tax rate, τd,i s
higher precisely when there is greater inequality among the entrepreneurs in terms of
productivity. This implies that, somewhat paradoxically, oligarchy may be more eﬃcient
in societies with greater inequality in terms of productivity.
397 Appendix B: Tax Revenues and Democracy
Here I brieﬂy discuss the empirical relationship between tax revenues and democracy,
shown in Figure 1. Appendix Table B1 includes regressions of tax revenues as a percentage
of GDP in 1998 on the democracy index and various controls. All economic variables,
unless otherwise indicated, are from the World Development Indicators 2002 dataset, and
the democracy index is from the Freedom House for 1997-98 or from the Polity IV dataset
for 1998. The Freedom House measure is transformed so that both indices assign higher
s c o r e st og r e a t e rd e m o c r a c y .I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt a xr e v e n u ea sap e r c e n t a g eo f
GDP refers only to the revenues of the central government.
Column 1 shows a strong raw correlation. The magnitude, 2.5 (standard error = 0.3)
indicates that a change in democracy from the level of that in Myanmar (7) to the best
score (1) would increase tax revenues over GDP by 15 percentage points. Column 2 shows
that this relationship is robust to using the Polity index.
Since democracies are typically richer than nondemocracies the relationship in columns
1a n d2m a yr e ﬂect the fact that taxes as a percentage of GDP increase with economic
development. To control for this, columns 3 and 4 add log GDP per capita. Even
though this reduces the coeﬃcient on democracy a little, and log GDP per capita itself
is signiﬁcant, the overall relationship is unchanged, and there remains a statistically and
economically signiﬁcant correlation between democracy and tax revenues.
The remaining columns focus on the Freedom House index and add additional controls,
including log of total population in 1998, average years of schooling in 1995 (from the Barro
and Lee dataset), continent dummies, and dummies for OPEC member and formerly
communist countries, and ﬁnally, column 10 adds all of these variables at the same time.
The relationship remains strong and signiﬁcant in all cases, though the addition of the
continent dummies somewhat reduces the magnitude of the relationship.
Column 11 repeats the regression of column 3 excluding the formerly communist coun-
tries, and ﬁnally, column 12 excludes all federal countries (according to the list from
Handbook of Federal Countries, 2002). None of these aﬀect that the correlation between
tax revenues and democracy.
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Political rights 2.537 1.714 1.666 1.591 1.266 1.345 1.679 1.315 1.597 1.612
(0.301) (0.487) (0.517) (0.591) (0.465) (0.437) (0.467) (0.573) (0.522) (0.482)
Polity democracy index 1.292 0.717
(0.234) (0.366)
Log GDP per capita 2.515 3.466 2.506 2.119 2.069 3.088 2.694 1.511 2.274 3.420
(1.090) (1.226) (1.105) (1.764) (0.982) (0.982) (1.057) (1.463) (1.109) (1.154)
Log population -0.472 -0.319
(0.413) (0.570)














N 100 91 97 89 97 62 97 97 97 62 75 82
R-squared 0.347 0.285 0.375 0.357 0.383 0.403 0.571 0.408 0.416 0.598 0.365 0.449
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Tax revenues, GDP per capita, and population are for 1998 and come from the World Bank's WDI 2002. Tax revenues are for central government only.
Political rights from Freedom House for 1997-98 and Polity IV for 1998, between 1 and 7, with higher scores corresponding to more democratic countries.
Average years of schooling of the population over age 15 is for 1995, from the Barro-Lee Data Set. 
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